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J
ournalists, businessmen, politicians, and regulators are paying increasing
attention to the subject of discrimination in lending, with particular em-
phasis on mortgage lending. It sometimes seems as though the main issues
in antidiscrimination efforts have shifted from education and labor markets to
the credit markets.
Two different federal laws deal with discrimination in lending: the Fair
Housing Act (FHAct) and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). These
fair lending laws prohibit lenders from discriminating in credit transactions
on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, and other speciﬁed
grounds.1 But the laws provide little practical guidance for enforcement, par-
ticularly with regard to the role of the banking regulatory bodies. Congress left
to these agencies and to the courts the job of working out the speciﬁcs of how
to deﬁne and promote the laws’ purpose—fair lending.
While discrimination has been discussed widely in the popular and profes-
sional press, an overview of the two fair lending laws and their enforcement
is difﬁcult to ﬁnd. Section 1 describes these laws, their origins, and the in-
terpretations that the courts and enforcement agencies have given some of
This article has beneﬁted greatly from comments and suggestions from Marvin Goodfriend,
Tom Humphrey, Anatoli Kuprianov, Jeffrey Lacker, Roy Webb, and John Weinberg. Alex
Mendoza provided excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are the author’s
and do not represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal
Reserve System.
1 Two other laws often mentioned in discussions of fair lending are the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA) and the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA). While
both laws play a part in current fair lending enforcement, neither prohibits discriminatory lending,
so neither is deﬁned as a fair lending law. The HMDA requires depository institutions to report
data that are frequently used in investigations and studies of lending discrimination. The CRA
requires the banking agencies to consider a depository institution’s efforts to meet the needs of
its community when it applies to the banking agencies for permission to expand. As currently
interpreted by the agencies, this has meant that a bank’s fair lending performance is weighed
when considering such an application. For discussions of the HMDA and the CRA, see Canner
and Smith (1991) and Lacker (1995), respectively.
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their provisions. Section 2 discusses the three major methods of enforcement
of the laws: (1) complaints from aggrieved parties leading to investigations
by enforcement agencies, (2) civil court actions, and (3) examination by the
federal banking agencies.2 When it comes to their part of enforcing the fair
lending laws, the banking agencies follow procedures long used in carrying out
their responsibilities for bank safety and soundness. Speciﬁcally, they employ
periodic fair lending examinations of all banks.3 Yet the examination of every
institution, whether or not the agency suspects discrimination, is strikingly
different from the practices of the federal agencies responsible for other areas
of anti-discrimination law enforcement. Section 3 discusses the enforcement of
other antidiscrimination laws. The absence of periodic exams in other areas of
antidiscrimination law enforcement naturally leads one to ask whether routine
use of exams for banks is the most efﬁcient means of enforcing the fair lend-
ing laws. The concluding section raises brieﬂy some issues that bear on this
question.
1. THE FAIR LENDING LAWS
The Fair Housing Act (FHAct) was passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1968, which Congress enacted following urban unrest in many U.S. cities in
1965, 1966, 1967, and after Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination in early
1968. According to a Supreme Court opinion, Congress intended the FHAct
to contribute to the elimination of ghettos by reducing discriminatory housing
practices (Trafﬁcante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 409 U.S. 205
[1972], cited in Board of Governors, Consumer Compliance Handbook [1995]).
The FHAct prohibits discrimination in many activities of the residential real
estate industry besides lending. The act prohibits discrimination by race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status (if a household includes children), and
national origin.4,5 It prohibits the refusal to sell, rent, or negotiate for the sale or
rental of housing for discriminatory reasons. Varying the terms of sale or rental
in a discriminatory manner is prohibited, as is falsely claiming that housing is
not available for inspection, sale, or rental. The act also prohibits real estate
2 These agencies are the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, the
Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Ofﬁce of Thrift Supervision, and the National
Credit Union Administration.
3 I will use the term “banks” throughout to refer to commercial banks, thrifts, and credit
unions.
4 As passed, the FHAct prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, and
national origin. A 1974 amendment added sex as a basis. A 1988 amendment added handicap
and familial status.
5 Unless otherwise noted, I will use the word “discrimination” throughout to mean discrim-
inating on the basis of categories such as race, gender, or familial status.     
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brokerage organizations, such as multiple-listing services, from discriminating
in their terms of access to the organization.
Section 805, the fair lending portion of the FHAct, makes discrimination
unlawful in several aspects of home ﬁnance. Speciﬁcally, it prohibits discrim-
ination in the making or purchasing of loans, the proceeds of which are for
purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling. The
prohibition applies to any person or entity whose business includes engaging
in residential real estate-related credit transactions.
The FHAct is enforced by the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (HUD), by individuals, and by the Justice Department. Under the act,
HUD may take enforcement actions against lenders based on complaints from
individuals or on its own initiative. Individuals, or organizations representing
individuals, may pursue civil court actions under the act for discrimination
against them. A civil action may be brought in a federal court by the Jus-
tice Department whenever it believes that a lender is engaged in a pattern of
discrimination.
The federal bank regulatory agencies also enforce the act. These agencies
are the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve
(Fed), the Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Ofﬁce of Thrift
Supervision (OTS), and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA).
Since the act says little about their enforcement responsibilities, the banking
agencies have been left to determine largely on their own how to enforce the
FHAct.
The fair lending section of the FHAct does not specify actions or policies
that are considered discrimination.6 This means that the agencies responsible
for the act’s enforcement have little to guide them in the investigation of lend-
ing discrimination. At ﬁrst blush, the identiﬁcation of lending discrimination
might seem a simple matter. The difﬁculty arises because discrimination, in the
broad sense of the word, is a fundamental function of a successful lender. To
remain proﬁtable, a lender must avoid (discriminate against) borrowers who are
unlikely to repay, and favor those who will repay. Enforcement agencies are
left with the difﬁcult job of separating appropriate discrimination from discrim-
ination prohibited by the act. Court decisions have provided broad guidance,
but detailed direction is lacking.
In 1972, a U.S. Supreme Court ruling established a procedure for deter-
mining whether an individual has been treated differently based on his minority
status. Such discrimination goes by the phrase “disparate treatment.” The case
dealt with employment discrimination, but the courts later applied the precedent
to lending discrimination. The Supreme Court set out four factors that a plaintiff
6 This contrasts with the housing section of the FHAct, which provides an explicit list of
actions which are discriminatory under the law.   
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must establish to make a prima facie case of employment discrimination. The
plaintiff must show (1) that he belongs to a racial minority, (2) that he applied
and was qualiﬁed for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants, (3)
that, despite his qualiﬁcations, he was rejected, and (4) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek equivalently
qualiﬁed applicants (McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 [1973],
cited in Board of Governors, Consumer Compliance Handbook [1995]).
To translate these standards for use in lending cases, the courts simply
substituted the idea of creditworthiness qualiﬁcations for job qualiﬁcations
(Hickson v. Home Federal of Atlanta, 805 F. Supp. 1567 [N.D. Ga., 1992];
aff’d, 14 F.3d 59 [11th Cir. 1994], Gross v. U.S. Small Business Admin., 669
F. Supp. 50 [N.D. N.Y., 1987]). Therefore, to make a prima facie case, the
plaintiff must show (1) that he is a member of a protected class, (2) that he
attempted to get a loan and met all relevant qualiﬁcations for doing so, (3)
that the bank refused to make the loan despite the plaintiff’s qualiﬁcations, and
(4) that, after his rejection, the bank continued to make loans to equivalently
qualiﬁed applicants. Banking agency investigation procedures are based in part
on determining whether these factors are met (see Board of Governors, Con-
sumer Compliance Handbook [1995], p. 1.19). The courts and the agencies are
left to make difﬁcult decisions, however. No two loan applications are exactly
alike, so it is impossible to match a rejected minority application perfectly to an
accepted non-minority application, and by doing so show discrimination. The
courts and agencies must decide whether similar applications are enough like
the rejected minority application to persuasively show discrimination. At the
very least, however, this ruling provided what the statute lacked—a doctrine to
guide policy.
In addition, courts and banking agencies have recognized that the FHAct’s
prohibitions against discrimination extend to “redlining” (Laufman v. Oakley
Building and Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 [S.D. Ohio, 1976]; Ring v. First In-
terstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924 [8th Cir. 1993]; Cloud and Galster 1993,
p. 109; Board of Governors, Consumer Compliance Handbook [1995], p. 1.59).
Redlining is the practice of denying loans for housing in certain neighborhoods,
even if the loan applicants are creditworthy. According to the courts and bank-
ing agencies, redlining is unlawful when the decision to avoid making loans
in a particular neighborhood is based on the race, national origin, religion, or
other similar categorization of residents of the neighborhood. Redlining is not
unlawful when based entirely on economic considerations, such as the location
of a neighborhood in a ﬂood plain (Interagency Task Force on Fair Lending
[1994], p. 5; Board of Governors, Consumer Compliance Handbook [1995],
pp. 1.58–1.59).
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act also prohibits lending discrimination.
This act was passed in 1974 as an amendment to the much broader Consumer      
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Credit Protection Act, passed in 1968.7 Speciﬁcally, the ECOA prohibits dis-
crimination in all personal and commercial credit transactions based on race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, and other bases.8 The
prohibitions apply to anyone regularly extending credit or arranging for the
extension of credit. The ECOA is broader than the FHAct since the ECOA
covers virtually all lenders while the FHAct covers only real estate-related
lending. Housing lenders are subject to both statutes.
As originally passed in 1974, the ECOA only prohibited discrimination
based on sex and marital status. Congressional hearings preceding the passage
of the ECOA had produced testimony of lending discrimination against women
and particularly of women denied credit without the signature of a male (Senate
Rep. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in U.S. Code: Congressional
and Administrative News 403, 404 [1976]; Board of Governors, Consumer
Compliance Handbook [1995], p. 1.12). Additional bases were added by a
1976 amendment. In 1974 hearings, instances were reported of discrimination
based on age and race. In addition, during 1974 the banking agencies conducted
studies on loan acceptance and rejection rates for minority versus non-minority
applicants. Holding creditworthiness factors constant, the studies found much
higher rejection rates for minorities (Senate Rep. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
2, reprinted in U.S. Code: Congressional and Administrative News 403, 405
[1976]; U.S. Congress, Senate [1993], pp. 570–71).
Besides prohibiting lending discrimination, the ECOA includes some re-
quirements not explicitly related to fair lending. Within thirty days of an
application, a lender must notify the loan applicant whether the application
has been accepted or rejected. In the case of a rejected application, a lender
must state the reasons for the denial or tell the denied applicant that he may
have a statement of the reasons on request. Lenders also must provide, either
routinely or at the applicant’s request, copies of any appraisal reports.
The ECOA requires the banking agencies to ensure that depository insti-
tutions comply with the act’s requirements. The ECOA delegates to the Fed
the authority to “prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of the title.”
These regulations are the Fed’s Regulation B. Each regulatory agency is re-
sponsible for ensuring that the depository institutions it normally supervises
comply with the ECOA and Regulation B. Several other federal agencies are
responsible for enforcing compliance by other types of ﬁrms that make loans.
7 The Consumer Credit Protection Act encompasses the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act.
8 Other bases on which lenders may not discriminate include an applicant’s status as a
recipient of public assistance and an applicant’s claim of any right under the Consumer Credit
Protection Act.   
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These agencies include the Federal Trade Commission, the Small Business
Administration, the Farm Credit Administration, and others.
The ECOA has left the agencies and the courts with much to work out
concerning its enforcement. For instance, like the FHAct, the ECOA leaves
largely undeﬁned the actions and policies that are considered discrimination. In
addition, the act does not tell the enforcement agencies how to uncover discrim-
inating creditors or discriminating actions. While the FHAct outlines HUD’s
complaint response procedures, the ECOA does not address such procedures.
Nevertheless, like the FHAct, the ECOA stipulates that any creditor is
subject to one of three enforcement actions. First, a person alleging injury may
sue the creditor in a federal district court. Second, the federal agency with
jurisdiction may take action against the creditor. Third, the Justice Department
may pursue a civil action against a suspected violator. Such action may occur
if another enforcement agency refers the case to the Justice Department or if
the Justice Department suspects a pattern of violations.
Court decisions have helped to deﬁne discrimination under the ECOA as
they have under the FHAct. In the legislative history of the 1976 amend-
ment to the ECOA, Congress showed that it meant for the act to encompass
a new concept of lending discrimination. Discrimination is to include not only
disparate treatment (discussed above) but a discrimination standard recently
developed by the courts, “disparate impact” (Senate Rep. No. 589, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2, reprinted in U.S. Code: Congressional and Administrative News
403, 406 [1976]). Disparate treatment occurs when individuals receive differ-
ent treatment because of their minority status. Disparate impact occurs when
minority individuals and non-minority individuals receive equivalent treatment
but a lending policy has a disparate effect on minorities. Making loans for
amounts no smaller than a set minimum is the classic example of a policy with
a disparate impact. Since, on average, minorities are over-represented in low
income brackets, they will more frequently seek low value loans. Therefore,
they will be rejected more frequently for loans than will non-minorities under
a minimum-loan-amount policy.
The courts developed the disparate impact standard in employment dis-
crimination cases, including a 1971 Supreme Court ruling, Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. (401 U.S. 424 [1971]). In that case, several black employees of
Duke Power Company challenged as discriminatory the company’s policy of
requiring a high school diploma and a passing score on an intelligence test as
a prerequisite for hiring and promotion. The Court ruled that the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 outlawed practices that had the effect of discriminating and that
Duke’s prerequisites had such an effect and were not signiﬁcantly related to
performance of the jobs in question (Board of Governors [1977b], p. 106;
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (401 U.S. 424 [1971]).
Following the 1976 amendment to the ECOA, courts extended this rule to
lending discrimination. They ruled that a complainant can make a prima facie         
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case of illegal lending discrimination if he can show that a lender’s policy has
a disproportionately adverse effect on a protected class. A policy is said to fail
the so-called “effects test” if it has a disproportionately adverse effect (Cherry
v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026 [N.D. Ga., 1980]).
Various courts have come to different conclusions over the burden of proof
the lender must carry to rebut the complainant’s prima facie disparate impact
case. Some courts have ruled that a lender must show a “legitimate business
reason” for a practice that produces the disparate impact. Other courts have
ruled that the lender must show a “business necessity,” a more stringent stan-
dard. In 1994 the federal agencies enforcing the fair lending laws came out
in favor of requiring the more strict burden for the lender (Interagency Task
Force on Fair Lending [1994], p. 7).9
2. ENFORCEMENT OF THE FAIR LENDING LAWS
There are three methods of enforcing the fair lending laws. First, the enforce-
ment agencies may take action in response to complaints. Second, individuals
or the Justice Department may bring civil court actions. Third, the banking
agencies periodically examine every bank for evidence of discrimination. The
agencies take remedial or punitive action if evidence of discrimination is found.
Complaints
An individual who believes he has suffered prohibited credit discrimination
may complain to (1) the Justice Department, (2) HUD if the loan is for real
estate, or (3) the federal agency with fair lending enforcement powers over the
institution believed to have discriminated. The FHAct requires HUD to receive
and respond to complaints of fair lending violations. The FDIC, the Fed, and
the OCC are each required to maintain a consumer affairs division by the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1975 (U.S. Congress, Senate [1976], p. 1).10 These divisions receive and take
action upon consumer complaints, such as complaints of fair lending violations.
The Justice Department also responds to lending discrimination complaints that
it receives.
Each year these organizations together receive over a thousand complaints
of alleged credit discrimination (see U.S. Congress, Senate [1993], pp. 668–69,
9 For further discussion of the history and current status of the disparate impact standard
in lending discrimination, see Vartanian, Ledig, and Babitz (1995), Dennis and Bachman (1995),
and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Ofﬁcial Staff Commentary on Regulation
B, Equal Credit Opportunity (1995), sect. 202.6(a)-2.
10 The name of the act derives from its sponsors Senator Warren G. Magnuson and Repre-
sentative John E. Moss.        
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680, 700, and 742; U.S. Department of Justice, annual reports of the Attorney
General [1977–1987]; U.S. Congress, Senate [1990], p. 119). The agencies
investigate each complaint of suspected lending discrimination. If the agencies
uncover evidence of discrimination, they may attempt to resolve the complaint
by obtaining agreement between the parties. Beyond this, the banking agencies
and HUD may require remedial action or may penalize the violator, while the
Justice Department can sue. Sometimes one agency refers the case to another
agency.
Courts
Based on provisions in both the ECOA and the FHAct, an individual who
believes he has suffered prohibited credit discrimination may also seek relief
directly from the courts. According to the legislative history of the ECOA,
Congress viewed the power of individual claimants to bring civil court cases
as a primary mode of enforcement of the statute (Senate Rep. No. 589, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in U.S. Code: Congressional and Administrative
News 403, 415 [1976]).
Private fair housing and civil rights agencies have become more active
in facilitating fair lending actions taken by individuals. For instance, one of
the ﬁrst agencies, the Toledo Fair Housing Center, has produced a number of
victories for borrowers either in court, in settlements outside court, or through
complaints made to the federal enforcement agencies (Cloud and Galster 1993).
Similar organizations also have become active recently, producing several large
settlements for their clients, and initiating additional suits (Sweet 1995, p. 4;
Washington Post, September 22, 1995; American Banker, January 10, 1995).
Beyond the ability of individuals to bring court cases, the Justice De-
partment may bring civil court actions under both the FHAct and the ECOA.
Before 1988, Justice Department enforcement powers were limited under the
FHAct and the ECOA; the Justice Department was not granted the power
to seek monetary awards. In 1988, an amendment to the FHAct granted the
Justice Department the authority to seek monetary awards for damages and
civil penalties. A 1991 amendment to the ECOA similarly expanded the types
of relief the Justice Department could seek in fair lending cases brought under
that statute.
Before these amendments provided the Justice Department with the author-
ity to seek monetary awards, most fair lending actions by the Justice Department
resulted in small out-of-court settlements that aroused little popular interest.11
Since the early 1990s, however, every suit brought by the U.S. Department of
Justice has been the focus of great interest, at least among lenders. Each year
11 At least one lending discrimination case brought by the U.S. Justice Department went to
trial (U.S. v. American Future Systems, Inc., 743 F.2d 169 [3d Cir. 1984]).   
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since 1992 the Justice Department has investigated several fair lending cases
resulting in large out-of-court settlements against lenders. In these settlements,
the lenders agreed to signiﬁcant penalties, including compensation for victims,
modiﬁcation of lending procedures, and increased efforts to reach minority
individuals or communities.
In civil court cases brought by individuals under the FHAct, the courts
may award actual and punitive damages and other equitable relief. The act sets
no maximum for these damage awards. In court cases brought by the Justice
Department under the FHAct, penalties for violations are the same as in cases
brought by individuals, except that civil penalties beyond actual damages are
limited to $50,000 for the ﬁrst violation and $100,000 for any subsequent
violations. Under the ECOA, individuals and the Justice Department may seek
actual damages and the imposition of injunctions. An injunction is a court order
requiring a party to do or refrain from doing a speciﬁed act. But lenders may
not be made to pay punitive damages to an aggrieved individual greater than
$10,000. In class action suits, punitive damages are limited to the lesser of
$500,000 or 1 percent of the lender’s net worth.
Examination
Examination by the banking agencies provides the third method of enforcing
the fair lending laws. The banking agencies probe the institutions they supervise
for evidence of lending discrimination in periodic, on-site fair lending exami-
nations. For banks examined by the Fed, a fair lending examination occurs at
least every two years. The other agencies have differing schedules.
Fair lending examinations have their origin in, and are modeled after, bank
safety and soundness examinations. In a safety and soundness examination,
examiners from a federal banking agency investigate a bank’s riskiness and
ﬁnancial health. The agencies examine every bank periodically. The examina-
tions include an on-site analysis of the bank’s management, its policies and
procedures, and its key ﬁnancial factors. Additionally, examiners verify that a
bank is complying with banking laws and regulations. Because of this, exam-
iners gained responsibility for verifying compliance with the fair lending laws
when these laws were passed.
Besides the fair lending laws, a number of other banking consumer pro-
tection laws, such as the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
and the Fair Credit Billing Act, were passed by Congress during the 1960s
and early 1970s. Examiners gained responsibility for banks’ compliance with
these laws too. Between 1976 and 1980 the FDIC, the Fed, the OCC, and the
NCUA established “consumer compliance” examinations separate from safety
and soundness examinations because performing both consumer law compli-
ance and safety and soundness tasks within the same examination was too     
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burdensome.12 Examiners who specialize in consumer law compliance (compli-
ance examiners) perform fair lending examinations. The consumer compliance
examination covers the fair lending laws and the other consumer protection
laws. While separate from the soundness examination, the consumer compli-
ance examination follows the model of periodic, on-site examinations used in
the soundness examination.13
In the fair lending portion of compliance examinations, the examiner checks
for evidence of disparate treatment, redlining, and disparate impact. The exam-
ination for disparate treatment of minorities may proceed along several lines.
Since the early 1990s, the banking agencies have been using statistical tests
to aid them in their search for evidence of discrimination.14 Compliance ex-
aminers may run statistical tests on the outcomes of a bank’s loan approval
process to decide if minority status is correlated with the frequency of denial,
factors other than minority status held equal. When such a correlation is found,
examiners manually review a sample of loan application ﬁles to determine
whether factors omitted by the statistical testing methods explain the statistical
results. The main focus of statistical testing is mortgage lending, since minority
status data are available only for mortgage loans.
Relatively large numbers of mortgage applications from both minorities
and non-minorities are necessary for valid testing. Without large numbers, the
tests cannot produce meaningful results. Only one in ten banks receives enough
mortgage loan applications to allow the use of these tests.15 Since these banks
tend to be the largest mortgage lenders, large portions of all outstanding mort-
gage loans are therefore made by banks subject to statistical testing.16
12 In January 1989, separate consumer compliance examinations for savings institutions were
established by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (U.S. Congress, Senate [1990], pp. 36–37;
U.S. Congress, Senate [1993], p. 693). In late 1989, Congress created the OTS to replace the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board as supervisor of savings institutions, following the thrift crisis
of the 1980s. The OTS continued the practice of separate consumer compliance examinations.
13 See Board of Governors (1977a) for a discussion of the history of consumer compliance
examination.
14 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, two of the banking agencies began using functionally
similar but less sophisticated tests. The OCC and the FDIC collected data from banks they super-
vised regarding loans accepted and rejected, race, income, and measures of creditworthiness of
the applicant. They then ran statistical analyses that tested for correlations between minority status
and rejection, with creditworthiness held equal. The results of these tests guided examiner efforts
in searching for evidence of discrimination. While the statistical testing procedures begun in the
1990s are more sophisticated and employ more creditworthiness variables, the methodology and
goals are equivalent. The FDIC dropped its use of this technique in 1982 (U.S. Congress, Senate
[1990], pp. 44, 155, and 170–71). For discussion of these early techniques, see U.S. General
Accounting Ofﬁce (1981), pp. 50 and 84, and Milroy (1980), pp. 17–33, and 128.
15 Calem and Canner (1995), p. 121.
16 For discussions of fair lending testing techniques, see Calem and Canner (1995), Bauer
and Cromwell (1994), and Stengel and Glennon (1995).   
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Examiners use only informal techniques when examining most banks, since
formal statistical tests can be used only on a small portion of banks. Fair lend-
ing examinations have included informal techniques since the late 1970s. The
examiner typically chooses a sample of accepted and rejected applicants and
gathers key creditworthiness information for the applicants from the bank’s loan
application ﬁles. The examiner secures a written copy of the bank’s lending
decision criteria or interviews bank ofﬁcials to learn the criteria. For example,
lending decision criteria might include the bank’s minimum down payment
percentage, its maximum loan-to-value ratio, and its maximum debt-payments-
to-income ratio. The examiner determines whether treatment of accepted and
rejected applicants accords with the bank’s written or articulated loan criteria. If
the bank rejects minorities when its loan criteria suggest acceptance, or accepts
non-minorities when the loan criteria suggest rejection, the examiner has reason
to suspect discrimination. The examiner will then expand his investigation. For
example, assume a bank has a policy of normally rejecting applicants whose
debt-payments-to-income ratio will exceed 36 percent if granted the loan. The
examiner might become suspicious if this bank allows higher ratios more fre-
quently for whites than for Hispanics. Characteristics of sampled rejected and
accepted applicants are also compared directly to determine if the bank accepts
non-minority applicants but rejects similarly qualiﬁed minority applicants. If
this comparison leads the examiner to suspect disparate treatment, he conducts
a more intensive investigation.
In searching for signs of disparate treatment by a bank, the examiner also
compares the racial and ethnic makeup of the bank’s application and loan pools
to the racial and ethnic makeup of its market area. If the proportion of appli-
cations from minorities differs signiﬁcantly from the proportion in the bank’s
market area, the examiner might suspect that the bank is discouraging minorities
from applying for loans (“prescreening” minority applicants). Alternatively, a
signiﬁcant differential between the proportion of minority loan approvals and
the proportion of minorities in the bank’s market area could be a sign that the
bank is rejecting minorities for discriminatory reasons. In either case, further
investigation would be called for (Board of Governors, Consumer Compliance
Handbook [1995], pp. 1.43–1.48).
Next, the examiner reviews the bank’s loan policies for any that could
amount to redlining or for any discriminatory impact. If the examiner ﬁnds
policies he believes may have such effects, the bank is allowed to present an
explanation.
The agencies’ responses to violations uncovered during examinations can
vary. They may simply require the bank to change its loan policy. They may go
further and require it to pay a sizeable monetary penalty either as restitution to
injured parties or to the U.S. Treasury. More serious or repeated violations can
earn more severe penalties. Whenever an examination uncovers a pattern of fair
lending violations, a provision of the ECOA requires the agencies to notify the      
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Justice Department.17 While the requirement applies explicitly only to ECOA
violations, it covers most FHAct violations as well. Most fair lending violations
of the FHAct will be violations of the ECOA, since the former act includes
only real estate lending, while the latter covers all types of lending. Some
FHAct violations will not be ECOA violations because protected classes differ
slightly under the two acts. Once notiﬁed, the Justice Department may then
choose to investigate and bring a civil action. If the agencies ﬁnd violations of
the FHAct, they must report them either to HUD or to the Justice Department.
3. ENFORCEMENT OF OTHER
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS
The ﬁrst two sections of this article have discussed the fair lending laws and
their enforcement. But these fair lending laws are only part of antidiscrim-
ination law. For instance, laws also prohibit discrimination in employment,
housing, and voting opportunities. This section contains a brief description of
the enforcement activities of several major federal agencies responsible for
employment and housing antidiscrimination law. In contrast to the banking
agencies’ practice of examining all banks for evidence of credit discrimination,
the federal employment and housing agencies do not employ routine examina-
tions to enforce antidiscrimination statutes. Instead they investigate institutions
only in response to a complaint or other signal of a possible violation. Alterna-
tively, one employment-discrimination law-enforcement agency conducts audits
(examinations) of a small subset of institutions. It also responds to complaints.
The major federal agency responsible for employment-discrimination law
enforcement investigates employers only if there is prior suspicion of discrim-
inatory activity. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is
responsible for enforcing four laws prohibiting employment discrimination:
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The EEOC’s prin-
cipal means of enforcing these statutes is through response to complaints of
discrimination. These complaints may come from an employee, a rejected job
applicant, or an individual or organization acting on an employee’s behalf. The
EEOC handles complaints by investigating and making a determination on the
merits of the complaint. It may seek a settlement between the parties. If the
EEOC cannot produce a settlement, it may litigate the case (Bureau of National
Affairs 1995, pp. 0:3101–0:3812).
Though complaints are the primary source of EEOC action, the EEOC
may itself initiate an investigation. Leads for these charges may come from
tips gathered during investigations of other employers. They also may come
17 This requirement was established by a 1991 amendment to the ECOA.     
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from the media, other government or private civil rights groups, union and
trade associations, and employment agencies. Data from employers on num-
bers and classiﬁcations of minority and non-minority employees can provide a
lead (Bureau of National Affairs 1995, p. 8:0002).
Another leading federal employment discrimination enforcement agency
is the Ofﬁce of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), a division
of the Department of Labor. The OFCCP is responsible for the enforcement
of three antidiscrimination and afﬁrmative action statutes covering institutions
receiving government contracts. It enforces the statutes with complaint inves-
tigations and compliance reviews (“audits”), which are similar to the banking
agencies’ examinations.
Although the techniques used in an OFCCP audit are similar to those
used in a bank fair lending examination, OFCCP audits only a small subset of
contractors.18 For example, in 1994 it audited 4,100 contractors, selected from
a population of 192,500, for compliance with the laws (Ofﬁce of Federal Con-
tract Compliance Programs [Undated]). Contractors are selected to be audited
based in part on the percentage of women and minorities employed relative
to comparable percentages employed by the aggregate of all such employers
(Fox 1993). Even if no problems are found, an audit is costly for the audited
contractor.19 Therefore, the threat of an audit provides an incentive for con-
tractors to maintain the percentage of women and minorities they employ at
or above their peer group’s average. This helps the OFCCP meet its afﬁrma-
tive action responsibilities. Other factors are considered when deciding which
contractor to audit. These factors are the time elapsed since the last audit,
employee or job applicant complaints, negative community group comments,
and whether the contractor is adding employees (Fox 1993). Unlike bank fair
lending examinations, to which all banks are subject periodically, contractors
may go years without an OFCCP audit, if they are audited at all.
The primary federal enforcement agency responsible for housing discrim-
ination is HUD. Like the EEOC, HUD investigations typically result from
complaints of discrimination. Occasionally HUD initiates an investigation. For
example, some sign of housing discrimination, such as a newspaper story, can
generate this type of investigation.
18 During OFCCP audits, personnel ﬁles are examined to determine if comparable minority
and non-minority individuals are treated similarly. Personnel policies are examined for any poli-
cies that may have a discriminatory effect. The treatment of minorities relative to policies are
examined for signs of discrimination.
19 According to Fox (1993), an audit costs a contractor an average of $25,000.   
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4. CONCLUDING COMMENT
Banking agencies enforce fair lending laws by examining all banks for evi-
dence of discrimination. As we saw in Section 3, this contrasts sharply with
enforcement in other areas of antidiscrimination law, where routine examina-
tions are not employed. The banking agencies’ general use of routine exams
has evolved as the best means of guaranteeing the safety and soundness of
the banking system. But are routine examinations the most efﬁcient means of
ensuring fair lending? This is a difﬁcult question.
The examination of every bank, whether or not it is suspected of discrim-
ination, is expensive for both banking agencies and banks themselves. Relying
instead on other enforcement mechanisms, such as complaints and legal actions,
has the great advantage of directing scarce resources to identiﬁable problems.
Nevertheless, one can imagine several issues that ought to be considered in
weighing the costs and beneﬁts of the alternatives. Victims of discriminatory
lending practices may not always be aware of the discrimination. If this is the
case, then complaints and private lawsuits might not induce sufﬁcient enforce-
ment. On the other hand, enforcement agencies receive hundreds of complaints
of discrimination each year. Moreover, the growing interest of housing groups,
the press, and attorneys in credit discrimination will expand borrowers’ knowl-
edge of the laws that protect them and thus encourage complaints and lawsuits.
Matters are complicated further by the fact that fair lending legal actions
seem likely to produce beneﬁts to society beyond those received by the plain-
tiff alone. For example, policies of a defendant bank that are unknowingly
discriminatory may be identiﬁed by a lawsuit, and eliminated as a result. Con-
sequently, future customers will be less likely to be victims of discrimination.
Since plaintiffs do not reap all the beneﬁts of their own legal actions, the num-
ber of court cases brought may be too low from society’s point of view. On
this basis one might argue that routine examination of all banks, coupled with
the threat of penalties, supplements the antidiscrimination beneﬁts provided by
lawsuits. But an alternative to employing routine exams to supplement legal
actions would be to increase monetary awards to successful plaintiffs or to
perform random examinations on a small percentage of banks as done by the
OFCCP on government contractors.
From long practical experience, routine exams have been found necessary
to ensure the safety and soundness of the banking system. Whether or not
routine exams are also the most efﬁcient means of ensuring fair lending is a
matter deserving of further research.    
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